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B O O K  R E V I E W  
Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral Limits o f  the Criminal 
Law, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), xix+328 
pp., $ 29.95. 
This second volume of Feinberg's four-volume work on the moral 
basis of criminal law defends the offense to others principle. Fein- 
berg's liberal position is that the principles of offense and harm to 
others (defended in the first volume)1 are the only acceptable ~ 
grounds for criminal legislation. The subsequent volumes will 
address principles that Feinberg rejects. The offense principle sup- 
ports criminal legislation that is probably necessary and effective 
in preventing conduct that causes serious offense to others. 
According to Feinberg, proper application of the offense prin- 
ciple by use of mediating maxims supports laws against public 
nudity, obscene billboards, and the public display of swastikas in 
Jewish neighborhoods such as Skokie, but not laws prohibiting 
obscene books, films, or language over the airwaves. The discus- 
sion of obscenity and pornography is one of the best, and longest, 
in the philosophical literature. 
In reviewing Harm to Others, I commented at length on Fein- 
berg's methodology and assumptions. 2 Two of my complaints 
were that Feinberg argues from intuitions about particular cases 
and uses an ethical concept of harm. Those same points apply to 
this volume as well. The main argument rests "on the intuitive 
force" (p. 25) of a series of examples of revolting and disgusting 
bus passengers whom one cannot escape without great incon- 
I Joel Feinberg, Harm to Oth.ers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
2 Michael D. Bayles, Law and Philosophy 4 (1985): 423-432. 
Law and Philosophy 5 (1986) 113. 
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venience (pp. 10-13).  Feinberg argues that the only way to con- 
vince another that something is worthy of disgust is to get that 
person to share one's reaction (p. 106). However, it is not the only 
way to convince another that offensive conduct is worthy of 
criminal prohibition. 
In Harm to Others, Feinberg claimed that the sense of 'harm' 
appropriate to the harm principle is 'wrongful setback of interests'. 
The same approach is followed with the offense principle; the 
relevant sense of 'offense' is any of a set of disliked mental states 
"caused by the wrongful (right-violating) conduct of others" (pp. 
1-2).  One might thus expect an extensive analysis of rights to 
establish which disliked mental states one has a right not to be 
caused. Feinberg avoids such an inquiry, because "there will always 
be a wrong whenever an offended state (in the generic sense) is pro- 
duced in another without justification or excuse" (p. 2). Thus sug- 
gests that people have a right not to be offended. A justification, 
then, should have to do more than show that the offending actor's 
interests outweigh the other person's offense, for the offended 
person's right must be overcome. Feinberg never provides such an 
analysis; instead, he balances the interests of the parties involved. 
(Technically, offense does not violate an interest as Feinberg 
defines 'interest'.)3 The result is that the moral sense of offense i s  
largely irrelevant; it is trivially satisfied by the right not to be 
offended, and the arguments never give any independent weight 
to the right as opposed to the amount of nonmoral offense. 
Nevertheless, the requirement of an individual right plays a 
major role in Feinberg's argument. A central problem for a liberal 
is how to prevent the offense principle justifying prohibition of 
conduct in private when the bare knowledge of its occurrence 
causes offense to others. For example, suppose two lesbians, Ann 
and Beatrice, move into the apartment next to Charlie, and he 
is offended by the bare knowledge that homosexual activity is 
occurring next door. Feinberg's chief response is to pose a 
3 Feinberg, Harm to Others, pp. 49-50. 
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dilemma: the argument.for prohibition rests on either the prin- 
ciple of legal moralism or the offense principle (pp. 67-68).  
A liberal rejects legal moralism, and the offense principle does not 
apply. Even if lesbianism is morally wrong, Ann and Beatrice do 
not violate a right of Charlie's. His objection is an impersonal one; 
he is not a victim; his personal rights are not violated any more 
than those of any other opponent of homosexual conduct. 
Feinberg allows three possible exceptions to the rejection of 
bare knowledge offense: (1) bare knowledge offense might be per- 
sonal as when one's late spouse's corpse is mutilated, (2) repulsive 
public advertising of private offensive conduct, and (3) purposeful 
displays of offensive symbols such as swastikas. The last two 
exceptions raise questions about Feinberg's conception of free 
speech and the criminal law. Because freedom of speech is 
involved in type (2) cases, Feinberg does not support total prohibi- 
tion of such advertising, but he does contend that even nongraphic 
billboards and neon signs advertising cannibalism and so forth can 
be prohibited. They are detrimental to a public interest in the 
public ambience (p. 71). Provocative displays of swastikas in 
Jewish neighborhoods or the KKK in black ones do not even 
involve suppression of freedom of speech. Symbols such as the 
swastika have no function but to offend, and because of their 
association with historical barbarity, are deeply offensive (p. 95). 
However, these claims about swastikas pull in opposite directions. 
Surely the historical association of swastikas with repulsive geno- 
cidal policies give them political significance and meaning. The 
profound offense they cause is due to their reference to specific 
policies; were they not expressive of such views, they would not 
cause such offense. A new symbol would not be as meaningful a 
sign to Nazis or anti-Nazis. Consequently, Feinberg is wrong to 
deny them the status of protectable speech. 
More importantly, cases of both types (2) and (3) suggest that 
the criminal law can concern wrongs to the public as well as 
individuals. Feinberg restricts all criminal conduct to that which 
violates the rights of  individuals. Accumulative public harms, such 
as air pollution, are not criminally prohibitable, although the harm 
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principle along with fairness supports a regulatory system. 4 Yet, 
the effect of  offensive signs on the public ambience is an accu- 
mulative bad as much as air pollution. Either criminal prohibition 
of offensive signs is not appropriate, or criminal legislation against 
air pollution is appropriate. Moreover, Feinberg's requirement of 
violation of individual rights does not easily comport with the 
extant criminal law's emphasis on crimes as public wrongs. The 
state, not the individual, is the complainant in criminal cases. 
Granted, Feinberg could develop instrumental reasons for the 
public enforcement of the criminal law, but his fundamental con- 
ception is one of private, not public, wrongs. 
The offense principle is to be applied by balancing factors 
identified by mediating maxims. There are two sets of maxims 
based on tort law considerations for determining nuisances. One 
set assesses the seriousness of the offense, the other the reason- 
ableness of  the offending conduct. The seriousness of offense is to 
be determined by its magnitude (intensity, duration, and extent), 
avoidability, voluntary assumption, and dependence on abnormal 
susceptibility (p. 35). Although conceptually distinct, it might be 
possible to include the reasonable avoidability of offense under 
voluntary assumption. If an offense is reasonably avoidable, then 
it is reasonable to assume that one who incurs it does so volun- 
tarily. Of course, if one is ignorant of the likelihood of an offense, 
then one cannot voluntarily assume it even if it is reasonably 
avoidable. However, anyone who continues to experience a readily 
avoidable offense in effect does so voluntarily. Feinberg takes 
abnormal susceptibility as a ground for discounting the seriousness 
of an offense (pp. 26, 33, 35). In doing so, he claims to be follow- 
ing the law, but the law takes a different approach. It uses normal 
susceptibility as the benchmark for harm and offense. If conduct 
would not harm or offend a person of normal susceptibility, then 
there is no wrong. 5 However, if conduct would harm or offend a 
4 Ibid., p. 244. 
s See Nova Mink, Ltd. v. Trans-Canada Airlines, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 241 (N.S. 
Sup. Ct.) (negligence); Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P. 
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person of normal susceptibility, then compensation must be for 
the full extent of the harm even though it would have been much 
less but for the abnormal susceptibility. One takes one's victims as 
one finds them. Were Feinberg to follow this legal approach, he 
would have an additional argument against bare knowledge offense, 
for often bare knowledge offense is due to the abnormal suscep- 
tibility of the offended person. By only discounting offense due to 
abnormal susceptibility, Feinberg allows the possibility of pro- 
hibiting conduct due to the moral squeamishness of observers. 
Feinberg uses the following factors to determine the reason- 
ableness of offending conduct: its personal importance and social 
value, its involving freedom of speech, alternative opportunities 
for satisfactory conduct, its being done from malice and spite, and 
the character of the neighborhood in which it occurs (p. 44). 
According to Feinberg, to have a claim to protection offending 
conduct must be reasonable, but offense need not be. His two 
main reasons for not requiring offense to be reasonable are (1) that 
it would be partly redundant of the extent requirement, for if 
most people would be offended, the offense is probably reason- 
able; and (2) it would give legislators the dangerous power of 
determining the reasonableness of emotional reactions (p. 35). 
Offense and harm are parallel, he contends; and superstitious 
people should be protected from harm (p. 36). Perhaps he has in 
mind psychological shock or even death from a superstitious belief 
in voodoo. 
These contentions are not entirely satisfactory. First, Feinberg 
finds support in Evere t t  v. Paschall. 6 In that case, homeowners 
were awarded damages from a tuberculosis hospital in the neigh- 
borhood because they feared catching the disease, even though the 
court concluded that there was no scientific foundation for the 
2d 645 (1954) (strict liability); Impellizerri v. Jamesville Federated Church, 
104 Misc. 2d 620, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 550 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga Co. 1979) (inten- 
tional). 
6 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910); see Feinberg's indirect reference p. 293, 
n. 12. 
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fear. However, more recent courts have gone the other direction, 
for example, finding that a halfway house in the neighborhood, 
which caused homeowners unfounded apprehension was not a 
nuisance. 7 Second, Feinberg puts too much weight on the extent 
standard, in effect assuming the universality standard which he 
previously held but has now abandoned (pp. 27-32).  On his 
present view, offense need not be taken by nearly everyone. In 
the end, my disagreement cannot be settled by Feinberg's method. 
He simply intuits it as plausible to protect many people from 
irrational offense, while I do not. If a substantial number of 
people in a society are offended by public graphic depictions of  
people eating pork, Feinberg would support criminal penalties for 
the displays. 
There is a further ambiguity about the mediating principles. 
Feinberg's usual metaphor is one of balancing the reasonableness 
of conduct against the seriousness of offense. However, at one 
point he suggests that some cases fall so clearly under a standard 
that there is no doubt how to apply the offense principle (p. 45). 
He cites the Volenti standard which denies protection to offense 
voluntarily incurred. At another point, he seems to treat the 
reasonable avoidability and free speech standards as separate from 
balancing. He writes that displays of offensive symbols, such as 
swastikas, can be prohibited "provided of course that 'reasonable 
avoidability' requirements are violated, that free expression values 
are not centrally involved, and the other balancing tests are 
scrupulously applied" (p. 91; see also pp. 138 and 168). Although 
'other balancing tests' implies that avoidability and free speech are 
balancing tests, the thrust of the sentence is to treat them as 
necessary conditions. 
7 Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, 153 Conn. 507, 218 A. 2d 383 
(1966); see also McMillan v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 327 N.W. 2d 
559 (1983) (deed restrictions on state licensed group homes contrary to 
public policy) and Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust. 658 P. 
2d 827 (Colo. 1983) (upholding statute permitting group homes for mentally 
disabled in neighborhoods zoned for single families). 
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Another model for the use of the mediating maxims might be 
more appropriate. Some of the maxims state necessary conditions 
for application of the offense principle. If offense is voluntarily 
risked or easily avoidable (or unreasonable?), then the offense 
principle does not apply. Even though voluntariness and avoidability 
are matters of degree, for practical purposes there is a cutoff 
point; if the offense is at least that voluntary or avoidable, the 
offense principle does not apply. One then need not consider how 
intense, long, or widespread the offense is. If the offense was less 
voluntary or avoidable, then voluntariness and avoidability are to 
be balanced against other factors. 
A large part of Offense to Others, almost two-thirds, is con- 
cerned with obscenity. The ostensible reason is that Feinberg takes 
obscenity to be an extreme form of offensiveness. However, much 
of the discussion has little bearing on legislation, let alone criminal 
legislation. He claims that the standard use of 'obscene' in judg- 
ments is to express, predict, and endorse a response of disgust, 
although it can be used without one of these elements. Feinberg 
disagrees with the Supreme Court's restriction of obscenity to 
pornography and argues that prohibitions of obscene books and 
films to adults is unjustified. Essentially, the offense is voluntarily 
incurred and reasonably avoidable. He also rejects the claim of 
some women's advocates that pornography causes harm to women. 
His doubts center on the closeness of the causal connection, since 
the voluntary conduct of, say, a rapist intervenes between the 
distributor of pornography and the harm to the victim. 
'Obscene' can also be used descriptively to denote four-letter 
words. Feinberg devotes two chapters to the primary and derivative 
uses of obscene words. Although this is an interesting, plausible, 
and enjoyable account, it contributes little to social policy. The 
penultimate chapter on "Obscene Words and Social Policy" is a 
discussion of whether an effort should be made, and if so how, to 
eliminate obscene words (at least their offensiveness) from the 
language. Feinberg contends that they have valuable functions. Of 
course, all of this has nothing to do with criminal legislation. The 
final chapter does return to issues of criminal law. In it, Feinberg 
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holds that the offense principle cannot support the prohibition of 
obscene words in public places, but he does endorse the Model 
Penal Code's harassment provision s modified to include any 
harmful or offensive or alarming conduct. He also rejects the 
Supreme Court's decision in F.C.C.v.  Pacifica Foundation 9 
upholding an F.C.C. position against stations playing records with 
obscene language during times children might normally listen to 
the radio. Of course, since freedom of speech is involved and 
one can easily turn off the radio (the offense is easily avoidable), 
the offense principle does not apply. 
Overall, the offense principle is the weakest link in Feinberg's 
liberalism. Many liberals will want to reject it, and many con- 
servatives will seek to extend it to prohibit conduct liberals wish 
to allow. Feinberg has done an impressive job delineating a prin- 
ciple and mediating maxims that avoid the persuasive counter° 
examples of conservatives while allowing most of the freedom 
liberals (and libertarians?) desire. It thus fits the intuitions of 
moderate liberals. Moreover, the arguments for the position are as 
strong as one is likely to find. Nonetheless, one is left with a 
nagging doubt that one is inclined to accept it simply because it 
fits the emotional responses one has assimilated from one's liberal 
academic culture. 
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9 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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Bernard BoxiU, Blacks and Social Justice (Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
and Allanheld, 1984), vi + 251 pp., $34,50. 
In a just society all people would flourish or would come to do so 
in the fullness of time. If over successive generations a people 
should fail to flourish or lag considerably behind others, then that 
should be a cause for concern. Most people accept as fact that 
black Americans have been the victims of gross injustice. However, 
what should be done in light of this fact is a matter of consider- 
able controversy, as is evidenced by the fact that philosophers 
with common points of departure (such as Rawls's principles of 
justice) have managed to go in opposite directions. 1 
Boxill's book is the latest philosophical contribution to the 
debate. Here I focus only on Boxill's contribution to some of the 
key themes concerning racial equalky. There is much of impor- 
* In writing this review, I have profited from the instructive comments of 
Thomas Hill, Jr., Irving Thalberg, Susan Wolf, and, especially, Bernard Boxill 
himself. Charles Beitz played a major role in helping condense my essay. 
* Cf. Alan H. Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979) and Robert K. FuUinwinder, The Reverse 
Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis (Totowa: Rowman 
and Littlefied, 1980). For some the term reverse discrimination suggests that 
blacks are being favored over whites in the way that, in the past, whites were 
favored over blacks. Only someone with a very skewed view of American 
racism could maintain this. As Irving Thalberg, in 'Themes in the Reverse- 
Discrimination Debate,' Ethics 91 (1980), observes, foUowingJustice Brennan 
in his Bakke opinion: " . . .  no white is "stamped inferior" by RD [reverse 
discrimination]. Neither the intended nor the probable effect of RD upon 
whites compares with the effect of Jim Crow and tokenism upon everyone 
else" (138). 
Law and Philosophy 5 (1986) 121. 
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tance and interest in Boxill's book  which I shall not  touch  upon,  
including a look  at the legacy of  Booker T. Washington, a discus- 
sion of  Marxism in conjunct ion  with black progress, and an account  
o f  the nature o f  insults (which is part of  an assessment o f  Ronald 
Dworkin 's  views on busing). 
1. THE RELEVANCE OF COLOR? 
This posi t ion has a certain intuitive appeal: the practice of  consider- 
ing race when  hiring employees and admit t ing s tudents  was wrong 
in the past and must  be wrong now. The fact that  the race receiving 
preferential t rea tment  is now black rather than white does not  
make the practice any less wrong. 
BoxiU thinks otherwise. He does not  a t t empt  to show that  
giving preferences to blacks does not  make opportuni t ies  unequal  
for whites. Nor does he insist that ,  under  the present circum- 
stances, redressing past wrongs simply requires that  whites be 
disadvantaged for a period o f  t ime. He writes: 
I concede that color-conscious policies giving preference to blacks place an 
insurmountable obstacle in the path of whites, and since such obstacles 
reduce opportunities, such policies may make opportunities unequal. But 
this gives no advantage to the advocates of color-blind policies. For giving 
preference to the competent has exactly the same implications as giving 
preference to blacks. It, too, places obstacles in the paths of some people, 
this time the untalented, and just as surely makes opportunities unequal 
(17). 
... adopting a color-blind principle entails adopting a talent-blind principle, 
and since the latter is absurd, so also is the former. Or, in other words, 
differences in talent, and differences in color, are, from the point of view 
of justice, on a par . . . .  Color-conscious policies can conceivably be just, 
just as talent-conscious policies can conceivably b e -  and often are- jus t .  
It depends on the circumstances (18). 
This argument  f rom analogy is fascinating but  I do not  find it 
convincing. Talent-conscious policies are not  in tended  to be 
corrective ones. They are in tended to serve the ends o f  excellence 
rather than  of  justice. Al though such policies place obstacles 
in the path o f  the untalented,  a policy that  does this is not  there- 
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by a corrective one intended to serve the ends of justice. 
By contrast, color-conscious policies of the sort Boxill has in 
mind are intended to be corrective (for past injustices), and thus 
are pressed in the service of justice. With talent-conscious policies 
the question is: Are they permitted as a means to attaining ex- 
cellence? with color-conscious policies, the question is: Are they 
permitted as a means to attaining a just end (correcting for past 
injustices)? An afFtrmative answer to the first question does not 
commit us to an affirmative answer to the second one. The two 
policies are not analogous in the respects in which BoxiU would 
like them to be. 
Among the staunchest supporters of the view that color-conscious 
policies are unjust are devotees of the free-market system, that is, 
capitalism. These people consider the system to be something of a 
wonder drug for eliminating racist hiring policies, if not for curing 
employers of racist beliefs. The idea is that it is most profitable 
to hire the most qualified person. Hence, racist hiring practices 
will tend to bow to the capitalist's concern to maximize profits, if 
such practices stand in the way of maximizing profits - and it is 
assumed that such practices do. Among those who have gained 
considerable notoriety for advancing this line of reasoning are 
Walter williams and Thomas Sowell. 2 They maintain, in particular, 
that a free-market system will serve to eliminate black subordina- 
tion and that government enforced color-conscious policies, which 
are not in keeping with such a system, have the effect of perpetu- 
ating black subordination rather than eliminating it. 
One reason why BoxiU's Blacks and Social Justice makes such a 
significant contribution to the literature is that he subjects their 
views to a very penetrating critique (chapter 2). Boxill makes it 
clear that there is nothing inherent in capitalism that would make 
2 For representative writings, see Walter Williams, Manhattan Report on 
Economic Policy, vol. 2, no. 8 (New York: Manhattan Institution for Policy 
Research, 1982) and The State Against Blacks (New York: McGraw-HiU, 
1982); Thomas Sowell, Ethnic America: A History (New York: Basic Books, 
1981) and Markets and Minorities (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981). 
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it resistant to racist hiring policies. Whether it is in the interests 
of an employer to have racist hiring policies is not independent of 
public preferences and tastes (26-39).  If the dislike of blacks is 
so widespread that most of the public would not patronize a busi- 
ness which hired blacks, then capitalism, far from floundering in 
the face of racist hiring policies, flourishes as a result of them. It 
would not be in the self-interest of an employer to hire blacks 
regardless of her own feelings and beliefs about them. As Boxill 
writes: " . . .  precisely the same argument that Sowell and Williams 
use to show that the free market compels employers not to 
discriminate can be used to show instead that the free market 
compels employers to discriminate" (29). Capitalism would 
cure racism only if the disease has already been made to loosen 
its grip on the mind of the public. 
2. A F F I R M A T I V E  A C T I O N  
As Boxill quotes Michael Kinsely as saying, "No single develop- 
ment of the past fifteen years has turned more liberals into former 
liberals than affirmative action" (147). Boxill does not offer his 
own view on the topic but undermines various criticisms of the 
backward- and forward-looking arguments for affirmative action. 
Three concerns occupy Boxill: (a) Does affirmative action 
compensate the wrong group of blacks, namely middle-class blacks 
who can measure up in the first place? (b) Does affirmative action 
benefit middle-class blacks at the expense of lower-class whites? 
(c) will affirmative action, in fact, make for a better society? To 
(a), BoxiU's response is that while middle-class blacks may be 
deserving of less compensation than disadvantaged blacks, it by no 
means follows that the former are deserving of no compensation at 
all. He writes: "Because I have lost only one leg, I may be less 
deserving of compensation than another who has lost two legs, but 
it does not follow that I deserve no compensation at all" (148). 
Boxill's contention is not that aU blacks have been debilitated by 
racism, but that all have been wronged by society in so far as 
society has forced them to live with the threat of not having 
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their rights respected. Here, a powerful, if not unwitting, ally 
would seem to be Robert Nozick himself who maintains that 
people should not have to live in fear of having their rights trans- 
gressed and that they are owed compensation for having so to 
live. 3 
As to (b), Boxill's response can be put quite simply: affirmative 
action may very well benefit middle-class blacks at the expense 
of lower-class whites, but this is no more or no less unfair than a 
practice which allows a dean of a school to select five admittees 
each year without reference to the screening process, as was the 
case at the Davis Medical School, it being invariably the case that 
those who benefit from the policy are not lower-class whites, but 
those whites who already enjoy so many of society's amenities. 
Turning to (c), Boxill reminds us that this question cannot be 
answered a priori. His suspicions are that affirmative action would 
make for a better society if for no other reason than that it would 
result in blacks receiving more and better services, since white 
professionals are more likely to serve the affluent white than black 
professionals (168). The reason for this need not be that blacks 
are altruistic, but that racism is a bar to black professionals thriving 
among whites. Here Boxill echoes Ronald Dworkin's position. 4 
Conservatives are opposed to color-conscious policies (which 
include affirmative action), even in the case in which color is used 
simply to break ties. This is the least troublesome case of  affirm- 
ative action, but if a case can be made for it, then some progress 
has been made. Here Boxill manages to at least put conservatives 
on the offensive although his argument that talent-conscious and 
color-conscious policies are analogous fails. 
Boxill allows that discriminatory practices can be an affront to 
the self-respect of persons (151,196, 89-95);  for example, they 
may perpetuate negative stereotypes about the group in question. 
Thus, a society forces a people to live with the threat of not 
3 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974: 
pp. 73-78.  
4 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977): pp. 232 ff. 
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having their rights respected, and Boxill thinks that people should 
be compensated for this. The negative stereotypes under which all 
blacks presently labor are the result of past injustices. 5 The stereo- 
type that blacks do not have as much intellectual capacity as 
whites affects all blacks, not only the "ghetto" blacks. Racists do 
not check to see if a black is from the ghetto before questioning 
his intellectual abilities. 
Consider the following scenario. Two people, Xb and Yw, apply 
for the only position at Small College, and they are identical with 
respect to all professional qualifications. The only difference is 
that X is black and Y is white. It clearly follows from Boxill's 
views that Xb morally ought to be hired over Yw; and the argu- 
ment is purely a compensatory one. Society owes it to blacks to 
dismantle the negative stereotypes which have been put in place as 
a result of  the many years of  discrimination which blacks have 
suffered. It is something that blacks can claim that society should 
do on their behalf. 
The account can be made institutionally relative. Suppose that 
we have Xb, Yw, and Z, and that both Xb, Yw are equal with 
respect to all professional qualifications, but both are inferior to 
Z, who is the best person on the job market. Some universities 
have the practice of hiring a person only if she is a Z-type, in 
which case they may pass over xb-and  Yw-types. But needless to 
say, this is not the policy of all universities. Very little hiring 
would get done if it were. So, if there is a Yw whom the university 
is prepared t o  hire, though it realizes that Yw is inferior to Z, 
then if there is an Xb who is equal to Yw, then universities moral- 
ly ought to hire Xb over Yw. (Z's ethnicity is irrelevant.) 
s To appreciate the power of stereotypes notice that Polish jokes invariably 
fail to be funny when Jews are substituted for Poles. The explanation for this 
is very simple: While Jews may get to be many things according to the stereo- 
type - parsimonious, shrewd, and so on, they do not get to be dumb. Hence, 
Polish jokes are not as innocuous as many would like to believe. The humor 
of such jokes rides on the assumption that Poles are dumb. If stereotypes can 
have a bearing on whether or not we laugh, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that they can have a bearing on our behavior in other ways. 
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The BoxiUian account offered is compensatory precisely because 
the very point of affirmative action on this account would be to 
correct for the wrongful misconceptions under which blacks 
labor and which are the result of past wrongs, among them being 
that blacks are not as intellectually capable as whites. Conservatives 
must acknowledge this much about the prevailing stereotypes. 
Had academies across the U.S. not engaged in racially biased 
admissions and hiring policies, it is unlikely that blacks would now 
be laboring under the stereotype that they are not the intellectual 
equal of whites. 
Boxill makes it clear that whether some blacks have flourished 
in spite of this and other negative stereotypes fostered by racism 
does not detract from the fact that these stereotypes have been an 
obstacle in their development. In the case of ties between job 
candidates, it might be supposed that the only fair way to proceed 
is to flip a coin. By hypothesis, such cases have tO be decided by 
some nonacademic consideration. Flipping a coin is, of course, one 
fair way to proceed; however, there is surely no reason to think 
it is the only fair way. 
The Boxillian account speaks to his concerns (a)-(c) mentioned 
above. (a) While it may be that middle-class blacks, as opposed to 
poor ones, benefit the most from affirmative action, it may be 
that the former are best able to dismantle the negative racial 
stereotypes that have been in place for so long. (b) Affirmative 
action is not at the expense of lower-class whites even if society 
has also perpetuated negative stereotypes about them. For, being 
lower class is not something immediately apparent, with the right 
clothes, hairstyle, and speech, one would never know that a white 
is from the lower class. Needless to say, these things would not 
render invisible the fact that one is black. It follows, then, that 
lower-class whites do not suffer under negative stereotypes about 
them in the same way or to the extent that blacks do. (c) Clearly, 
blacks are better off if the negative racial stereotypes are broken 
down, and presumably whites are no worse off for it; hence, society 
is better off for it. 
Finally, let me note that the account offered addresses the kind 
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of concern Thomas Nagel has with affirmative action. This is that 
the self-esteem of those who are hired under the aegis of affirmative 
action is threatened (199). 6 The black hired is as qualified as the 
white whom the university is prepared to hire; so there is no 
reason for the black to feel that his own merit did not win him the 
position. The black should feel no more threatened than if his 
obtaining the job had been determined by the flip of  a coin. What 
is more, if the self-esteem of whites is not threatened when they 
know that they are admitted under a policy which allows a 
university official to select five admittees each year without refer- 
ence to the screening process, then surely the use of  color to break 
ties should not threaten the self-esteem of blacks. 
3. INTEGRATION AND FLOURISHING 
As I said at the beginning, in a just society a~ people would come 
to flourish in the fullness of time. One of the great contributions 
of Boxill's work is that it enables us to see dearly that the yard- 
stick by which human flourishing should be measured is not the 
satisfaction of interests, where that is tied simply to the satisfac- 
tion of desires or wants. Instead, the yardstick must be an ideal 
of human nature (95-106).  
It is in connection with busing that Boxill indirectly discusses 
the interests conception of flourishing as he discusses the interests 
conception of harm. According to this view, " . . .  a person is harmed 
when his interests are invaded, and he has an interest in something 
if he stands to gain or lose depending on its condition or outcome" 
(95). Interests here are to be understood in terms of wants or 
desires. 7 
6 Thomas Nagel, 'Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973): 349-363. 
7 Boxill focuses primarily upon Joel Feinberg's view. As far as I can see, 
Feinberg embraces the idea that a person flourishes when his interests are 
satisfied. See Joel Feinberg, 'Rights of Animals', in Rights, Justice, and the 
Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). See pp. 
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It is an untoward consequence of this view that segregation does 
not harm minority children even if it results in their having deep 
feelings of inferiority. This is because such children do not have an 
interest in not feeling inferior. Adults may be able to see that any 
child will be worse off should he come to have feelings of inferior- 
ity but innocent children do not see that. Hence, in terms of their 
present wants and desires it cannot be explained that their having 
feelings of inferiority are contrary to their interest. 
The move to make, of course, is to refer to the future interests 
of children. But as BoxiU sees, once the dust has settled, this move 
gets one nowhere for the kinds of interests children will come to 
have in the future is tied to what is done to them in the present 
(96). There are few future interests that children will come to have 
independently of what is done to them. So, if it is one of our con- 
sidered judgments that children are harmed by practices which 
cause them to have deep feelings of inferiority, then we shall 
have to capture that judgment by appeal to something other than 
the interests conception of harm. For it can deliver that judg- 
ment only if certain interests are posited independently of wants 
or desires. But then interests are no longer explained in terms of 
wants or desires, and we have a different theory from the one 
with which we started. 
Boxill's objection to an interests conceptions of harm and 
flourishing is "not merely that they fail to provide us with a 
rationale for attacking segregation" (100), but that "they have 
no ideal of human nature" (100). He assumes that "there is a 
normal and proper way for children's minds and bodies to func- 
tion and grow, and a normal and proper way for adults' minds and 
bodies to  function" (101). He invokes what he calls a Platonic 
conception of harm, since this conception makes reference to 
essentials of growth and functions. He writes: 
... a harm is defined as something blocking, diverting, or interrupting a child's 
proper and normal mental or physical growth, or as something impairing the 
167--171, esp. p. 170f. See also his Harm to Others (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984): ch. 2. 
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ability or capacity of an adult's or child's body or mind to function in a 
normal and proper way (101). 
Armed with these considerations, Boxill rightly takes it to follow 
straightaway that parents are not free to do with their children as 
they please; in particular, " . . .  parents cannot have the complete 
right to choose their children's education" (108). As he observes, 
it also follows that " . . .  the freedom of communities to control 
schools should be restricted" (109). The upshot is that we have a 
very powerful argument against, on the one hand, blacks who 
think that black communities should be free to control the school 
systems in their area and, on the other, against those on the right 
who, for quite different reasons, insist on this. Children should 
not be the pawns of political ideology. 
For Boxill, whether busing is inimical to the flourishing of black 
children is an empirical matter. More generally, he considers it an 
empirical matter whether separation or assimilation is inimical 
to the flourishing of black people, offhand, it may seem that to 
say this is to come dangerously close to playing into the hands of 
racists. But not quite. The racist objects in principle to racial (or 
ethnic) integration; he has a stake in its being the case that at least 
one race, namely his own, is the worse off for doing so.8 
However, when racial integration involves a dominant culture 
and a people who have been victims of considerable oppression, 
the concern over whether or not integration is a good thing for 
the latter need not in any way amount to an in principle objection 
to it. When such are the circumstances, racial integration can have 
an adverse affect upon the self-esteem and self-identity of the 
oppressed group. 
For instance, it turns out that the self-esteem of lower-class 
black children who attend lower-class black schools is higher than 
the self-esteem of those who attend predominantly upper-class 
s Here I follow Robert Nozick's illuminating characterization of a racist in 
Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981): 
325 note. 
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white schools, even though the scholarly performance of the latter 
surpasses the former. 9 The explanation is quite simple: self-esteem 
is based on comparison. In attending lower-class black schools, 
the lower-class black child compares himself with children the 
majority of whom are similar to him. However, in attending an 
upper-class white school, the black child compares himself with 
many children who are economically much better off than he is. 
To be sure, he may very well learn more, but is the gain in knowl- 
edge worth the costs to his self-esteem? 
Racial (or ethnic) integration can be inimical to the self-identity 
of an oppressed group if its members must adopt the values of the 
dominant culture at the expense of their own cultural and histori- 
cal identity. This may resuh in deep feelings of self-alienation. 
Black separationists have argued that the integrationist movement 
of the 1960s had this effect. 1° They think that the movement 
nursed rather than healed the wounds of black self-hatred. Al- 
though integration may provide great financial gains, these gains 
do not justify integration's negative affect on the black self- 
concept. 
If there is a moral to the foregoing considerations, it would 
seem to be this: Integration is good in that it can truly contribute 
to the flourishing of the group which is integrating itself, but only 
when integration does not pose a threat to the cuhural and histor- 
9 See Morris Rosenberg, Conceiving the Self(New York: Basic Books, 1979). 
His conclusions are based upon his study of black children in Baltimore 
public schools. See pp. 100-112 and 172-174. At one point he writes: The 
data show that it is much more easier for blacks attending segregated schools to 
believe that their race is viewed favorably by "most people in America" 
than it is for blacks attending desegregated schools" (111). 
l0 Cf. e.g., Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power 
(New York: Random House, 1967) and Malcolm X's views in Malcolm X 
Speaks in G. Breitman (ed.), (New York: Grove Press, 1966). For insights 
throughout this discussion, I am indebted to Howard McGary, Jr., 'Racial 
Integration and Racial Separatism: Conceptual Clarifications,' in Leonard 
Harris (ed.), Philosophy Born of Struggle (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing 
Co., 1983): 199-211. 
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ical ident i ty  of  the integrating group. Integrat ion is least likely to 
do this when  the integrating group has a way of  sustaining its 
cultural and historical ident i ty  independent ly  of  the social institu- 
tions of  the dominan t  culture.  In this regard, Thomas Sowell does 
not  appreciate an impor tan t  difference between blacks and his 
favorite comparison group, the Jews. 11 
It is one of  the fundamenta l  principles o f  psychology that  the 
ease with which individuals can cope with a new and/or  hostile 
environment  is directly proport ional  to their having a secure sense 
of  worth.  12 If, as is reasonable to suppose,  having a secure sense of  
their cultural and historical ident i ty  significantly contr ibutes to 
members  o f  a given group having a secure sense o f  worth ,  then my 
preceding remarks suggest that  in this regard blacks have been at 
a greater disadvantage than Jews. 
Religion has sustained the cultural and historical ident i ty  of  the 
Jews. 13 (This is not  the only way this ident i ty  can be sustained. 14) 
Whether the history o f  the Jews was taught  in the public schools, 
the Jewish religion has kept  the Jews very aware of  their history. 
As Charles Siberman writes: 
And the Jews, far from trying to erase the memory of stavery, have made it 
central to their religion: every Jew is enjoined to recall the fact that "we were 
slaves to Pharaoh in Egypt." The pronoun "we" is used because each individ- 
ual is to imagine that he himself, not just his ancestors, had been enslaved. Is 
it Thomas Sowell, Markets and Minorities, ch. 2. 
t2 cf. Rosenberg, Conceiving the Self, and Stanley Coopersmith, TheAntece- 
dents of  Self-Esteem (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976). 
t3 One only need to read, e.g., Chaim Potok's The Chosen (New York: 
Simon and Shuster, 1967) to appreciate this fact. 
14 For other ethnic groups, language has played a crucial role in the members 
sustaining their cultural and historical identity. 
is Charles Siberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 
1964): 78. If my memory serves me correctly, the predominantly Jewish 
junior and senior public high schools (classes virtually came to a halt during 
the high holidays) which I attended did not teach any black - then, Negro - 
history; but Jewish history was not taught either. 
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The Jewish religion and the Jewish culture are so inextricably inter- 
twined that having one without  the other is extremely difficult. 
What is more, because both  are linked to a strong lineage condi- 
tion, namely, being born of  a Jewish mother,  neither can be easily 
appropriated by  other cultures. 
The history of  Jews in America shows that, even when a group 
has an independent  vehicle which sustains its cultural and historical 
identity, it is still difficult to flourish in a hostile environment. 16 A 
fortiori, then, this must be so when a group is wi thout  such a 
vehicle. American blacks constitute one such group. 
Boxill is somewhat pessimistic about  blacks ever reaching their 
potential in America (226-228) .  17 The preceding remarks point 
to why that pessimism might be warranted. Surprisingly, the 
t6 See, e.g., Bruce Kuklick, The R/se of American Philosophy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1977). Chapter 24 contains a most interesting discus- 
sion of the plight of Jews at Harvard from 1920-1930. For instance, Henry 
Austryn Wolfson was appointed an assistant professor at Harvard with "... the 
understanding that he would not be permanent and that he would receive 
only such salary as "interested persons could contribute .... (457). More 
generally Kuklick writes: 
Although the philosophy department invited Jews to study there, it made it 
difficult for them to later find jobs. Perhaps it is fairer to say that the philos- 
ophers did the best they could for men whose names would have invited 
discrimination in any circumstances, but in the references written for Jews 
there is the unmistakenable flavor of Lowell-like [a former president of Har- 
vard] distaste for an unassimilated minority. Perry wrote of candidates that 
they were Jews without "the traits calculated to excite prejudice," having 
"none of the unpleasant characteristics which are supposed to be characteris- 
tic of the race"; Woods, that a candidate's Jewishness was "faintly marked 
and by no means offensive"; Hocking, that a man was "without pronounced 
Jewish traits"; and Lewis, that a young philosopher "of Jewish extraction" 
had "none of the faults which are sometimes expected in such cases" (456). 
Lowell nicely captures Harvard's attitude toward the difference between 
blacks and Jews, in the 1920s with the follox~_ng remark: "Cambridge could 
make a Jew indistinguishable from an Anglo-Saxon; but not even Harvard 
could make a black man white" (407). 
17 See, also, 'How Injustice Pays ?,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1981): 
359-370. 
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problem may be akin to the criticism that utilitarianism fails to 
take seriously the separateness of persons, is namely the failure to 
take seriously the separateness of ethnic or racial experiences. 
The black experience is not the Jewish experience, nor conversely. 
In claiming that any group can ,start at the bottom and, through 
hard work and dent of will, rise to become fully accepted mem- 
bers of society, Sowell is guilty of tunnel vision. He has fixed upon 
the economic ladder. What he seems to ignore is that getting on 
that ladder and staying on it, let alone climbing it, requires tremen- 
dous spiritual (that is, emotional) resources. Economic success is 
not - indeed, it cannot be - a substitute for those resources, any 
more than parental wealth, however generously distributed, can be 
a substitute for parental love. There are goods upon which money 
cannot obtain a purchase and without which economic gain, and 
more generally, life itself means precious little. Among them are 
dignity and self-respect. Boxill's Blacks and Social Justice is a 
powerful and eloquent reminder of this fact. 
Department of Philosophy 
University of North Carolina, 
Chapel HiLl, NC 27514, 
U.S.A. 
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Kent Greenawalt, Discrimination and Reverse Discrimination 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Borzoi Books, 1982), 222 pp. + 
xvii, US$ 8.00. 
Kent Greenawalt, a distinguished jurisprudent, has written a short 
and juicy book for use in college courses dealing with discrimina- 
tion, direct and reverse. Philosophical arguments, of all kinds on 
all sides, are here explained and appraised. Legal arguments and 
documents pertaining to this family of controversies are here 
compiled, organized, and commented on. From a great tangle of 
material and dispute, Greenawalt has pulled the main threads as 
he sees them; with these he has woven a provocative essay and a 
fine book. 
Essay and book must be distinguished. Just under two-thirds of 
the book is devoted to a compilation of authoritative materials - 
judicial, Constitutional, statutory and administrative - w h i c h  give 
the substance of American law in this sphere. This compilation is a 
distinguishing feature of the volume; there is only one other 
volume like it extant. 1 The author has brought together the key 
passages from the key documents, and with them has constructed 
a teaching tool of great usefulness. Keen intelligence lies behind 
1 Federal Civil Rights Law: A Sourcebook; U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., 1984, 143 pp. This volume, prepared by the Senate Sub- 
committee on the Constitution, in conjunction with the Congressional 
Research Service of the Library of Congress, is also very useful. In the statu- 
tory, administrative, and Constitutional spheres it is up to date, authoritative, 
and (as the Greenawalt volume could not be) complete. The Supreme Court 
cases, however, are merely listed in the Senate volume, with the references 
and a short summary given for each. 
Law and Philosophy 5 (1986) 135. 
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the preparation of this body of materials. I sketch its content 
here: 
It includes extensive excerpts from the Supreme Court opinions 
in almost all the major cases dealing with discrimination or prefer- 
ence by race or sex: 
(a) the 19th century cases on discrimination (Yick Wo, Plessy, 
and others); 
(b) the modern cases on discrimination (Korematsu, Shelley, 
Brown (I and II), Swan, Loving, and others); 
(c) the recent cases on preferential programs, or reverse dis- 
crimination (DeFunis, Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove ). 
It includes extensive excerpts from U.S. Federal statutes: 
(a) the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875; 
(b) Titles III, IV, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 
(c) the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 
It includes passages from three major Supreme Court cases 
dealing with discrimination by gender (Reed, Frontiero, and 
Craig), and from one major case dealing with reverse dicrimina- 
tion by gender (Kahn); and it includes the proposed Equal Rights 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
It includes Executive Orders 11246 (1965) and 11375 (1967), 
pertaining to equal employment opportunity, and the 1975 
Regulations of the Department of HEW on nondiscrimination, 
which sought to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 
It includes (of course) passages from the original U.S. Constitu- 
tion, and from its Amendments: XIII (1865), XIV (1868), XV 
(1870), XIX (1920); and it includes one classic sentence from the 
Declaration of Independence. 
It would be difficult to gather, in 140 pages, a more compre- 
hensive set of documents. In his Preface the author says that his 
book is intended for use in college courses in philosophy and 
government. "It is meant [he writes] to illustrate similarities and 
differences of moral and legal reasoning.., to serve as a basis for 
reflection about the proper role of the courts when they interpret 
authoritative constitutional and statutory standards of varying 
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specificity." [p. vii] These objectives are achieved. The compila- 
tion essential to their achievement is the great strength of this 
book. 
The 80-page essay that precedes the compilation attempts to 
compare moral and legal judgments; to review the history of the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in this country; and to appraise 
the arguments for and against reverse discrimination. The first two 
of these aims are accomplished systematically and successfully. 
But in its handling of racially preferential programs (of which the 
author cautiously approves) the essay is flawed. There is inevitably 
tension between the demands of a balanced explication of con- 
flicting claims and arguments on the one hand, and the evaluation 
of the positions of the conflicting parties on the other hand. 
Greenawalt openly seeks to achieve both of the these objectives. 
Another less apparent purpose is also his: the defense of racially 
preferential programs. In the pursuit of this end his efforts to be 
impartial in explication are undermined. 
Greenawalt gives his own position in the final pages of his 
essay: "The utilitarian reasons for [racial] preference are great 
enough, in my judgment, to include members of deprived minority 
groups who are not themselves deprived." [p. 69] Regarding the 
pains such programs may inflict upon innocent persons who are 
displaced from positions they would otherwise have got, but for 
the fact that they are white, Greenawalt writes, "If, however, 
[racial] preferences are a necessary part of a remedy or other 
important social good, the impact of the burden is not a strong 
reason for rejecting them." [pp. 62-63]  
In short, Greenawalt is an advocate - thoughtful and guarded 
but an advocate still - of racially preferential programs in profes- 
sional school admissions and in employment. I do not share that 
position, but I honor its thoughtful defense. No one will quarrel 
with the appropriateness of an essay aiming to provide that defense. 
In this essay, however, the author's convictions so penetrate his 
exposition of the arguments on the several sides that evenhanded- 
ness is sacrificed. The student for whom this book is intended, 
unfamiliar with the cases and the arguments, is in no position to 
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detect the imbalance. The prospective teacher-user of the book is 
put in an awkward position. 
Some illustrations of this difficulty here follow, taken from the 
ninth and culminating chapter of the essay, dealing explicitly with 
reverse discrimination. 
The Bakke case, addressing racial preference in medical school 
admissions, is the legal context of his discussion; much of his 
critical analysis is devoted to the several opinions written in that 
case, which resulted in the striking down of a racially preferential 
program at the University of California at Davis. The opinion of  
four justices, finding the Davis Program unlawful because it 
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Greenawalt 
recounts in one paragraph. For them, he says, the legislative 
history of the statute, "coupled with the language of the statute, 
which seems on its face to bar racial categorization" was sufficient 
to bar reverse discrimination." This is not entirely accurate. What 
the language of the statute bars is not racial categorization (which 
most will think appropriate in some contexts) but "discrimination 
under any program or activity" - that is, preference on racial 
grounds. The statute doesn't "seem" to bar that, it does so explic- 
itly and unambiguously. 2 
Greenawalt goes on to say that the other five justices "rejected 
that conclusion." This is technically accurate but very misleading; 
the conclusion rejected by all five of them was the sufficiency of 
the statute; one of those five, Justice Powell, finds that the prefer- 
ential program is to be condemned on constitutional grounds, and 
that the statute must be interpreted in the light of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which it implements. A student 
would have to scrutinize Greenawalt's account very carefully to 
learn that the preferential program at Davis was thrown out by the 
Court, and that Bakke was ordered admitted to that medical 
2 "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, #2000d). 
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school. Greenawalt is pained by these facts; he appears reluctant 
to say that Bakke won the case. 
When Greenawalt turns to the discussion of the Constitutional 
issues in the Bakke case, the opinions of the Court's minority are 
discussed not in one paragraph but in four sympathetically framed 
pages [pp. 79-81].  An unsophisticated reader might find it dif- 
ficult to see how it was possible for Bakke to have won. 
The pivotal opinion in the case, that of Justice Powell, Greenawalt 
thinks seriously mistaken. He reports it briefly, but does so using 
words that are sure to color the judgment of any reader who has 
not studied Powell's long and detailed analysis. Powell (Greenawalt 
tells us) "...creates a sharp dichotomy between...", "...talks of 
legislative findings of discrimination...", ".. .does not clearly 
indicate whether.. ." and so on. Powell's position is recounted in 
language that fails to convey what he (Powell) actually said in his 
Bakke opinion. 
Item: Greenawalt writes [p. 71] "Justice Powell... [insists] that 
generally the law must treat blacks and whites equally and that, 
from this perspective, most arguments for reverse discrimination 
advanced by the university were insufficient." That report is 
correct - but only because Powell finds all arguments for reverse 
discrimination insufficient, and finds reverse discrimination itself 
to be totally unacceptable under the Constitution. It would be 
hard to get that point from Greenawalt's account. 
Item: Greenawalt writes "He [Powell] thus concluded that 
universities can take race into account in deciding whom to 
admit." [p. 71] That too is correct but race may be taken into 
account only for the purpose of achieving the intellectual diversity 
that Powell finds central to university study, and not for other 
reasons. Powell forcefully rejects racial preference to give compen- 
sation, or to advance social goals, etc. as flatly unconstitutional 
Taking into account the race or other features Of applicants to 
insure diversity in the student body is not "reverse discrimina- 
tion". An impartial account of the outcome in the Baktee case 
must emphasize the very narrow limits within which that decision 
permits a university to use race in admissions. 
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Item: Greenawalt writes "But since this justification [achieving 
diversity in the entering class] would not by itself support the 
allocation of a fixed number of places for members of minority 
groups, he [Powell] declared the Davis program to be illegal." 
[I 9 . 71] This report is also technically correct but its wording 
makes it appear that Powell's rejection is based upon the fixity 
of the numbers, which it certainly is not. Powell states explicitly 
that the distinction between fixed "quotas" and "goals" is of no 
consequence here; it is preference on the basis of race, whatever 
the structure of the program, that he finds constitutionally unac- 
ceptable. 
Item: Greenawalt registers a series of objections to Powell's 
opinion in Bakke - all of  which may be countered in ways he does 
not mention. One illustration will exhibit the spirit of the attack. 
Greenawalt points out [p. 82] that if Justice Powell's principles 
were followed conscientiously (race being used, if at all, only for 
the purpose of achieving greater student diversity), some of the 
preferences given by some universities to some minority group 
members could not be honestly justified, and a thorough reexami- 
nation of all such racially preferential policies would be called for. 
He is dead right in this. Greenawalt then continues: 
It is unlikely that many universities would undertake this reexamination; and 
the result would be that programs entered into mostly for one set of reasons, 
and tailored to those reasons, would be continued intact although now 
legally supportable only for another, originally subsidiary, reason, to which 
those programs are not well tailored. This is a prospect of hypocrisy that is 
disturbing for institutions of higher education. [p. 821 
The possible hypocrisy of some universities is thus presented as an 
objection to the principles those hypocrites unlawfully evade. 
There is indeed much hypocrisy in professional school admissions, 
where the force of  the strict limitations upon the permissible uses 
of race, laid down in Bakke, is (or ought to be) fully understood. 
Such hypocrisy ought to end. But the possible misconduct of 
hypocrites determined to achieve their objectives is no good 
reason to abandon the principles of equal treatment they knowing- 
ly fail to respect. 
Book Review 141 
Item: When Greenawalt first mentions the Baleke case, in the 
opening paragraph of his culminating chapter, he gives a summary 
report of its opinions. He writes there: ". . ,but in University Of 
California Regents v. Bakke, four justices said that preferences 
were not legally appropriate, four said that they were appropriate 
even if a fixed number of places was set aside for minority group 
members, and one justice said that only more flexible preferences 
were appropriate." [p. 50] One who had not yet read the Bakke 
decision would be very likely to infer from this report, incorrectly, 
that the four who found the program "inappropriate" did so 
because the number of places set aside was "fixed". They did not. 
And one would surely infer from this wording that the single 
justice referred to (PoweU, of course) was quite prepared to accept 
racially preferential programs if only they were "more flexible" 
than that used at the University of California. He was not. The 
technical accuracy of Greenawalt's language here is arguable but 
there is little doubt that it would lead to some erroneous conclu- 
sions by even very careful readers. 
Final item: Within the culminating chapter there is a subsection 
on moral arguments based on utility. At this point the author's 
own position has not yet been expressly revealed. The subsection 
begins with the statement that there are strong utilitarian argu- 
ments in favor of reverse discrimination and against it; one is led 
to expect an evenhanded treatment of the two sides. One after 
another the utilitarian arguments in favor of reverse discrimination 
are explained with sympathetic vigor. But when the author turns 
to the arguments against reverse discrimination, the tone changes 
markedly. The terms used by the critic of racial preference are put 
in quotation marks whose only function is to cast doubts upon 
those arguments (e.g., "qualified applicant", and "drag down" the 
level of instruction, etc.). Much of Greenawalt's text in these 
paragraphs is in fact devoted not to the presentation of the utili- 
tarian arguments against reverse discrimination, but to the critique 
of those arguments [pp. 66, 67] and in one case even rejection, 
based on an "assumption of most educators in professional schools." 
[p. 68] The third argument against reverse discrimination, (only 
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three are given) is presented in six lines - followed by Greenawalt's 
remark that the point is sensible, but does not much apply to the 
defense of  racial preference he would support. In the presentation 
of the arguments in favor of reverse discrimination no such re- 
joinders are inserted. 
The imbalance of Greenawalt's account is revealed on careful 
inspection. That imbalance would be difficult for many student 
readers to detect, and (where noting it would require reference 
to portions of judicial opinions not included in the Compiled 
materials) very difficult to defend against. 
I have two final comments. First, it is regrettable that Greenawalt's 
essay (its ninth chapter, chiefly) has the features noted above. 
Yet the book as a whole has merits that outweigh these faults. It 
is clear and well written. It brings intellectual order into territory 
that has known little of that. These virtues, combined with the 
collection of source materials earlier described, make the book a 
useful teaching tool. That is what Kent Greenawalt wanted it to 
be. In the largest sense, therefore, he did succeed. 
Finally, the Supreme Court decision in Memphis Fire Depart- 
ment v. Stotts, (1984), came down after this book was published. 
Had it come earlier, it would have been included, of course, and 
might have had substantial irnpact upon Greenawalt's exposition. 
In this important case theSupreme Court declares, with ineluct- 
able clarity, the unconstitutionality of  the position Greenawalt 
defends. The majority opinion in this case includes the following 
passage, quoted from the Court's own decision in an earlier 
employment case: 
If individual members of a plaintiff class demonstrate that they have been 
actual victims of the discriminatory practice, they may be awarded competi- 
tive seniority and given their rightful place in the seniority roster.., however 
[it is] also.., clear that mere membership in the disadvantaged class is insuf- 
ficient to warrant a seniority award; each individual must prove that the 
discriminatory practice had an impact on him. 
Then, referring to Section 706g of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of  1964, which forbids discrimination in employment, the 
Court went on to say that the indisputable policy of that statute 
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is "to provide make-whole relief only to those who have been 
actual victims of illegal discrimination..." 
Kent Greenawalt has written a provocative book. But the 
reverse discrimination he defends is, happily, not now permitted 
under the law of our land. 
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